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Abstract
Experts agree that keeping systems up to date is a powerful
security measure. Previous work found that users sometimes
explicitly refrain from performing timely updates, e.g., due
to bad experiences which has a negative impact on end-user
security. Another important user group has been investigated
less extensively: system administrators, who are responsible
for keeping complex and heterogeneous system landscapes
available and secure.
In this paper, we sought to understand administrators’ be-
havior, experiences, and attitudes regarding updates in a cor-
porate environment. Based on the results of an interview
study, we developed an online survey and quantified common
practices and obstacles (e.g., downtime or lack of information
about updates). The findings indicate that even experienced
administrators struggle with update processes as the conse-
quences of an update are sometimes hard to assess. Therefore,
we argue that more usable monitoring and update processes
are essential to guarantee IT security at scale.
1 Introduction
“Keep your systems up to date” is one of the most popular
pieces of advice that security experts give to end-users [33,55].
Supporting this, Khan et al. found that there is a correla-
tion between not deployed updates and infected machines
[35]. Systems can easily be hardened against vulnerabilities
like Heartbleed 1 by applying updates. Regardless of that,
1http://heartbleed.com/, accessed 02/25/2020.
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many systems in the wild remain vulnerable for two years or
more [57]. A prominent example of a situation where an up-
date could have prevented severe data leakage is the Equifax
breach 2, which occurred in 2017. Similar incidents seem not
unusual as is reported by an industry report [42].
Related work studied user perceptions and experiences with
system updates and found that the results are often not in line
with current recommendations of experts from a security per-
spective. In most cases, concerns about functional issues or
unexpected UI changes hinder individuals from updating their
systems [63]. In addition, users often do not understand the
importance of non-visual changes [63], as they come with
security updates. In contrast to users who are responsible
only for managing their own personal devices, system ad-
ministrators are in charge of large and complex IT infras-
tructures while also being users. We argue that their update
behavior can have severe implications at a much larger scale.
Marconato et al. [43] observed the vulnerability life-cycle
on different platforms and found that the time to patch and
disclose vulnerabilities is decreasing. This finding can be ap-
plied to the Equifax breach and suggests that administrators
are required to react in a timely manner.
Although general user concerns about system updates have
been investigated in user studies, little light has been shed on
the perspective of specific user groups (e.g., administrators or
operators). Investigating administrators, Dietrich et al. [12]
found that insecure configurations are often caused by insti-
tutional and individual factors, as well as time constraints.
We assume that similar factors can have a negative impact on
update processes. Administrators are often overworked [12],
and updates are time-consuming. Secure systems, however,
rely on updates and therefore, require regular attention by
administrators. As the body of literature is still in an early
state regarding administrators’ update behavior, we follow an
inductive approach to explore the processes and obstacles that
administrators face when updating in a corporate context.
2https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/3/16410806/
equifax-ceo-blame-breach-patch-congress-testimony, accessed:
11/20/2019.
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Our contributions are as follows:
• We conducted seven qualitative interviews to explore
how administrators experience, perceive, and act
during the update process.
• We conducted an online survey with 67 valid answer
sets to test our observations on a larger scale.
• We confirm that current update processes and system
factors tend to endanger IT security and we discuss
critical factors that need to be addressed to support ad-
ministrators.
The results suggest that the update process differs among
companies for various reasons. Administrators face a variety
of obstacles in their update routines, e.g., downtime or hard-
to-foresee situations, that often hinder them from performing
updates in a timely manner. Overall, we argue that system ad-
ministrators would benefit from more usable mechanisms, and
that providing such mechanisms could effectively improve IT
security at scale.
2 Related Work
Two areas of research are specifically important for our work:
1) studies about update behavior and 2) studies investigating
the security behavior of expert users. In the following, we
present lessons learned from both research areas.
2.1 Users’ Update Behavior
According to security experts, keeping systems and software
up to date is an important security recommendation [55].
However, users may not follow this advice for reasons that are
not related to security [54], and only a minority of non-experts
actually considers software updates an important security
measure [33, 48]. It has been repeatedly shown that users
often delay or even avoid updates [22, 47, 64].
Investigation of the root causes of such critical user be-
havior has become a very active field of research. Previous
work revealed diverse reasons for avoiding updates. Many
users think that updates are not important because the link to
security aspects often is not obvious [15, 25, 45, 53, 63–65].
Furthermore, users are often afraid of functional changes (e.g.,
UI modifications) [7, 62–64] or fear making mistakes [22].
Inconvenience is an important factor as updates can cause
interruptions and take time [45, 64, 65]. Finally, bad expe-
riences with previous updates and negative online reviews
hinder the installation of future patches [15, 45, 59, 62]. This
problem seems self-perpetuating, because the frequency of
security updates is influenced by the emergence of novel at-
tacks and thus, cannot be controlled by the vendor alone [56].
However, high update frequencies can lead to further negative
reviews [21, 52].
Several countermeasures for mitigating the problem of de-
layed updates have been proposed. As one straightforward so-
lution, automatic updates [65] and silent updates [13,56] have
been deployed. Although such mechanisms are very effective
in keeping software up to date, they often cause confusion
and irritation as they hamper the user’s understanding of what
is happening on their machines [14, 65]. Furthermore, some
users might have good reasons to refrain from performing cer-
tain updates [14]. Therefore, user-centered solutions, such as
providing more information [44,50,58,59] and designing bet-
ter notifications [16, 17, 24], have been repeatedly suggested
as complementary concepts to further increase compliance
rates.
2.2 IT Professionals and IT Security
Recently, researchers have started focusing on security-related
usability problems of specific user groups [2]. In contrast to
security advocates [29] or security analysts [27], most of
these people are not security professionals. They are often
knowledgeable in a specific domain, related to IT. Several
recent studies addressed the problems of software develop-
ers [1,3,4,40]. For example, Acar et al. [1,3] investigated avail-
able sources of information and how these sources influence
code security. Gorski et al. [40] showed that software devel-
opers benefit from API-integrated security recommendations
and that such usability-optimized concepts can significantly
improve security [60].
Several human-centered studies with system administrators
were published between 2001 and 2007. In 2001, Hrebec and
Stiber [32] studied the mental models of system administra-
tors and found that these experts often struggle to understand
the complex systems that they need to manage. In addition,
the study participants reported a lack of formal education
and the desire to solve problems by themselves. Barrett et
al. [6] found that system administrators often lack situational
awareness. Haber and Kandogan [28, 34] and Botta et al. [10]
observed the tools and work practices of security administra-
tions and IT professionals. Their results show that security
administrators perform a lot of different tasks and need var-
ious skills like pattern recognition or inferential analysis to
perform these tasks. They proposed, that new classes of tools
need to be developed to counter the ever increasing complex-
ity of the systems and attack-vectors.
In contrast to this early work, a few recently published
papers investigated more specific problems of system admin-
istrators. Fahl et al. [18] studied non-validating X.509 certifi-
cates and revealed that about 30% of the responsible webmas-
ters misconfigured their web servers accidentally. Ukrop et
al. [61] analyzed the corresponding warnings and found that
rewording can help administrators to make better informed de-
cisions. Krombholz et al. [37,38] showed that the deployment
process for HTTPS is far too complex and that administra-
tors struggle with finding secure and compatible configura-
tions due to the lack of conceptual mental models. Dietrich et
al. [12] investigated the administrators’ general perception of
misconfigurations and identified missing or delayed updates
as one of the root causes of these problems.
There exists work that discussed update processes in com-
panies [8, 9, 46, 64]. For example, Vitale et al. [64] performed
three interviews with technical staff concerned with updates
and found that these professionals prioritized security aspects
and licensing issues over potential usability consequences.
This finding confirmed previous findings [46] that in a cor-
porate context, business needs rather than user requirements
drive update decisions. In contrast, Blythe et al. [9] reported
that employees often rely on “security experts” in the com-
pany to manage updates and often lack a feeling of responsi-
bility. Finally, the update challenges of system administrators
have been indirectly considered by various researchers who
proposed automatic tools to improve the manageability of the
update process (e.g., [5, 26, 39, 49]). However, none of these
concepts have been evaluated in a user study.
Parallel to our work, Li et al. [41] published a closely re-
lated paper in which they studied US-based system adminis-
trators in a qualitative fashion. They as well researched the
update process in companies and found several pain points
within the process. In contrast, our interview sample was
drawn from German companies, thus representing a different
culture. Overall, our study confirms most of their findings.
We will separately discuss our findings in comparison to Li et
al.’s in section 5.5 in more detail.
3 Interview Study
Although recommendations for patch management have been
published3, we are aware of only one other study that system-
atically investigated the update behavior of system adminis-
trators [41]. Therefore, we started with an interview study to
identify important factors of the problem space.
This interview study aimed to provide answers to the fol-
lowing research questions with an emphasis on administrators’
perceptions, challenges, and tools they use in their update rou-
tines:
1. How can the update processes be described, and
what common patterns are there?
Administrators are usually paid professionals who are
responsible for updating large and complex IT infras-
tructures. This raises the question, whether, and if so,
where, system administrators’ updates processes differ
from end-users’ processes [62].
2. What issues and obstacles do professional adminis-
trators face in their update routines?
We specifically aim at understanding the problems of
3https://www.infosec.gov.hk/english/technical/files/
patch.pdf, accessed 02/25/2020.
administrators and their perception of update processes.
Identifying obstacles in relation to processes, tools, and
environments is indispensable to define important direc-
tions for future work.
3. How are administrators informed about updates,
and which sources of information do they use?
Related work has indicated that the source of information
can have a significant impact on software security [1,20].
Thus, we aim at understanding how administrators gather
information and what sources they use.
4. What kind of tools do administrators use to man-
age system updates, and is there room for improve-
ments?
As usable security researchers, we are specifically in-
terested in the tools involved in the update process. We
hypothesize that although some tools are used on pur-
pose and other tools are unavoidable, such tools can
either complicate or ease the process.
3.1 Study Design and Procedure
We conducted seven semi-structured interviews in June 2018
to explore the participants’ opinions, thoughts, and experi-
ences. Based on three pilot-study interviews, we refined the in-
terview guidelines to balance between informing the research
questions and supporting a flexible exploration of the problem
space (i.e., leaving enough room to add further comments).
The interview was structured into (1) general questions about
the daily work routine of the participant, (2) general experi-
ences with updates, (3) a more detailed assessment of specific
aspects, and (4) additional comments. The guidelines are in
Appendix B.
All but one interview were conducted by the same re-
searcher. Both researchers are experts in computer science
and spoke the same native language as the interviewees. After
an introduction to the purpose of the study, the participants
were asked to sign a consent form. All participants gave their
consent to being audio-recorded. We conducted one inter-
view in person and six via telephone. All interviews were
held in German. During the interviews, the interviewee and
the researcher were allowed to take notes. The interviews
lasted between 34 and 67 minutes and ended with a short
questionnaire that collected demographic information.
3.2 Recruitment and Participants
We did not restrict our invitations to administrators work-
ing with a specific operating system, infrastructure or type
of update. The only criterion for inclusion was that partic-
ipants had to be in charge of, or in contact with, any kind
of updates. Personal contacts were used as entry points to
larger organizations and asked to forward the announcement
to their employers’ IT department. Additionally, we directly
approached representatives of medium-sized and large com-
panies at CeBIT 2018, a large international computer expo4.
In total, we recruited seven participants at companies that
had an office based in Germany. All participants reported they
were in charge of system administration, although they had
various job descriptions and managed different types of sys-
tems. Table 7 in the appendix presents more details about the
sample. All the participants were male. For ease of readability
in the following sections, we assigned the participants random
names.
3.3 Analysis
The interviews were transcribed, and coded by two re-
searchers. We coded open answers inductively following the
approach of Wertz, Charmaz et al. [66]. The two researchers
categorized the data according to the research questions pre-
sented in Section 3. The first three interviews were coded in a
batch to establish the first codebook. Each of the following
four interviews was coded separately. Then, the conflicts were
discussed, and new codes were added to the codebook. We
calculated the combined Krippendorff’s alpha [36] before
(0.61) and after (0.98) the discussion phase for each inter-
view. Our goal was to use the qualitative analysis solely as a
first step and foundation for the following quantitative study.
Therefore, we refrained from continuing with interviews until
theoretical saturation [23] was reached.
3.4 Qualitative Results
In the following, we present the results from the interview
study with respect to the research questions.
3.4.1 Update Processes
In Table 1, we present the sum of all extracted process phases,
including all reported steps that were performed in these
phases. Overall, the update process varied in time and struc-
ture among participants and tended to be variable even for
individual administrators, depending on the software that
needed an update. Cyril reported he worked in a client envi-
ronment with Windows systems. He was concerned mainly
with regular update cycles. Therefore, he was able to prepare
for update events (e.g., briefing the team, allocating resources,
allocating maintenance windows, and gathering information).
Four out of seven participants reported they relied on fixed
update cycles for client systems, although Zelko reported that
this was not always possible in practice. In contrast, Lorenz,
who worked at a smaller company, reported that employees
at his company were responsible for their systems. When we
discussed more specific software, the answers became more
diverse. Milan usually builds packages to automate the distri-
bution, but Markus tends to perform manual installations.
4https://www.cebit.de/, accessed 02/25/2020.
Although participants’ responsibilities differed, we were
able to identify common patterns in the update process. Most
of these phases can be mapped to those of client users [62].
However, we identified three major differences:
Some administrators perform extensive testing before in-
stalling the update on a live system. For example, Julian uti-
lized up to three stages. Zelko, who stated, that “[E]ven if
there is a risk that the update breaks something, we install
them timely”, utilized two test stages. First, he tested the up-
date with virtual machines that simulate the client landscape,
and then he rolled out the updates for a small group of col-
leagues.
Updates are rolled out step by step. The participants re-
ported that often not all systems are updated in one batch.
This allows the administrators to minimize the number of
misconfigurations once an update fails, but constraints on re-
sources are also a reason for this. For example, Julian reported
that the network would be used to capacity if all systems were
patched at the same time.
The preparation step is structured and involves planning
and research of resources and the allocation of time slots.
Five participants explicitly reported they conduct online re-
search before they install an update. In addition, Alexander
told that important update decisions are often made in group
discussions.
3.4.2 Obstacles
We identified various obstacles that hamper the administrators’
task of performing updates. In Table 1, we connect and report
obstacles to the phases of the update process. In the following,
we discuss common obstacles in more detail:
Downtimes. The participants stated that downtimes are
a serious obstacle in the update process which often cause
delayed deployments. As soon as a reboot is necessary, and
there is no redundant system, downtime is induced. Alexander
gave anecdotal evidence of a mitigation strategy: Upgrading
from Solaris 10 (which required significant downtime) to
Solaris 11 (which supports near to hot-swap updates and an
easy rollback) increased update frequencies from three times
a year to once a week.
Dependencies. The participants reported patches that break
dependencies usually delay the process. Although this may
not be surprising, it highlights the problem of dealing with
dependent systems that cannot be patched in time. Further
dependencies are introduced as part of the infrastructure land-
scape. For example, some systems depend on other systems
to be available at boot time (Markus). Assessing these depen-
dencies and then following the right order makes the process
highly complex. Another type of dependency is towards the
vendor of the software or hardware. An example of this can
be as trivial as no available patches, even if a vulnerability is
public, as Lorenz reported for the Meltdown case.
High frequency and large files. Every update takes re-
Phase Step Obstacles
Information Becoming aware
Further details Unsatisfying communication with the publisher*
Deciding Discussion Stability (1); Risk of exploits (2); Performance (1); Priority (2); Missing expertise
(1)
Preparation Planning Planning itself (3); Time of release (3); Communication (1); Missing documen-
tation about the system and processes*
Backup
Waiting for release
Obtaining the patch Missing patches (1)
Automating
Informing users
Testing Test system Testing itself (1); Broken dependencies (4); Resources*; Frequency of updates*
Pilot system
Problem solving with manufacturer
Installation Installation itself Failure (2); Missing configuration options (1); Social pressure; System resources
(2); Complexity (3); Missing tools (3); Heterogeneous system (6); Company
structure (3); Impact on systems/users (2); Downtime (1); Installation method
(manual/automatic) (1,1)
User interaction Waiting for users (1)
Reboot Reboot itself (3); Old/Slow hardware (1)
Post-Installation Documentation
Testing/Monitoring
Troubleshooting
Reversing Missing backup, failover, or redundancy*
Table 1: Overview of phases, steps, and obstacles. The number in brackets denotes the number of participants who mentioned
this aspect in the interviews. *Additional obstacles were found through the questionnaire.
sources: for example, time, workforce, CPU, and data storage.
Zelko reported that big update files, which are often a conse-
quence of combining functional updates with security patches,
can cause problems. To handle resource constraints, updates
are rolled out in multiple but smaller batches (Julian).
Competing priorities. Similar to standard users, administra-
tors’ decisions to perform updates are influenced by various
factors. Participants reported stability considerations, the risk
of an exploit, and performance issues as influential aspects.
The fact that some systems do not separate security and fea-
ture updates may intensify this situation. Finally, required
resources are sometimes allocated to other processes that
have higher priority. Alexander reported that “the decision
[to update] is always based on the sum of available infor-
mation”. As mentioned in Section 3.4.1, group discussions
are an important part of the process. However, the need for
communication can also delay updates (Milan).
Human Factors. In addition to technological and structural
constraints, the administrator faces other obstacles. Missing
expertise or a lack of knowledge can lead to situations where
administrators rely on third parties. In this regard, Lorenz
acknowledged that he does not always know how to act cor-
rectly. Or as Markus put it, he has to trust the vendor that the
classification of the patch is correct. System administrators
have to trust the information they get from the software de-
veloper, vendor, or other source. Another factor we identified
is social pressure, as Lorenz reported, “And you look like an
idiot, when you kill a git server. [...] That chases me.” An-
other aspect that makes updating harder for administrators
was software which is managed by end-users. Such software
is often installed without the knowledge of administrators and
makes the update process more complicated because it is not
integrated in standard processes.
3.4.3 Sources of Information
The participants reported they use various methods to inform
themselves about security updates and vulnerabilities. Five
out of seven participants reported they use third-party sources
that were independent of the software publisher, such as pop-
ular news portals or blogs. This information is usually supple-
mented by publisher-related newsletters and specific mailing
lists, such as the Ubuntu-security mailing list (Lorenz). Cyril
mentioned specialized third-party services that push informa-
tion about available patches. Others got more specific and
reported that they use tools like SCCM5 or Nessus6 which
serve as sources of information.
3.4.4 Tools
The participants reported OS-integrated tools and special pur-
pose tools that are used to update servers and clients and
that serve as sources of information. The purpose of such
tools ranged from monitoring systems (Julian) to complete
automation of the update process, such as SCCM or WSUS7
(Markus). Participants also named external services (e.g.,
Shavlik8) that test and pre-filter patches for companies. Al-
though automation of update processes was an important goal
for participants, it had not yet been fully implemented. Soft-
ware that is not covered by such tools, meaning not integrated
by default, has to be updated manually or integrated. This
seems to be the case when the vendors or the operating sys-
tems differ (e.g., using Microsoft WSUS to update Adobe
Flash Player). Although the integration is possible, it is con-
nected to additional effort and is not always done (Markus),
e.g., if it affects only a small group of clients (Milan). Con-
cerning future developments, Lorenz was less optimistic and
brought up that the time investment in tools that would ease
the workflow was not a high priority.
3.5 Key Observations
We performed an interview study of administrators’ update
behavior. Based on the research questions, we were able to
describe update processes, common obstacles, information
retrieval, and the use of software tools. We extract a series of
key observations to guide the construction of the quantitative
study, following the interviews. Table 1 provides an overview
of the process phases, tools, and obstacles that administra-
tors face in their daily lives according to the participants.
Table 2 presents nine key observations, which were formu-
lated based on the qualitative findings and then categorized in
three groups: “Update Process and Information,” “Update Ob-
stacles,” and “Human Factors.” In the next section, we report
on a quantitative online survey which was performed to shed
further light on the update behavior of system administrators.
5https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-platform/
system-center-configuration-manager-features, accessed
02/25/2020.
6https://www.tenable.com/products/nessus/
nessus-professional, accessed 02/25/2020.
7https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/
administration/windows-server-update-services/get-started/
windows-server-update-services-wsus, accessed 02/25/2020.
8https://www.ivanti.com/company/history/shavlik, accessed
02/25/2020.
ID Observation
Update Process and Information
U1 Online sources are an important source for administra-
tors to get informed about updates.
U2 Small companies have no formal update process.
Update Obstacles
O1 Performance considerations often hinder the installation
of an update.
O2 Update-caused downtimes delay the installation of an
update (e.g., reboots)
O3 Problems after the installation of an update on the live
system are only a minor concern.
O4 Lack of information hinder the update process.
O5 User action (e.g., installing a software without the knowl-
edge of the admin) can circumvent the update process
and render it useless.
Human Factors
P1 Administrators of big companies feel sufficiently trained.
P2 Administrators think that timely updates are important.
Table 2: Key observations based on qualitative results.
4 Quantitative Online Survey
Following the interviews, we performed a quantitative online
survey. We created statements based on our observations in
the interview study and developed an online questionnaire to
quantify and enrich them.
4.1 Procedure and Structure
The recruitment process for the preliminary interview study
indicated that system administrators are inherently short on
time, and thus, minimizing the time to fill out the survey
was indispensable to obtain a sufficient number of responses.
Therefore, most of the questions were based on simple an-
swer types, such as check boxes or rating scales. To further
motivate participation, we offered an opt-in for a raffle of 3D
prints. Every tenth participant had the chance to win a 3D-
printed model of their choice. E-mail addresses were collected
only for this raffle, stored separately, and deleted afterward.
Twenty-three entered their contact email address of whom
no one was interested in a print. After participants had given
their consent to take part in the study, the survey started. Com-
pletion took about 10 minutes.
To support many different circumstances, we framed ques-
tions in a way that answers could be related to the current
position or if not applicable, to the last position as system ad-
ministrator. We started by collecting demographic data (e.g.,
age), personal information (e.g., years of experience), infor-
mation about the work environment (e.g, their role, company
size), and information about update processes (e.g., existence
ID Statement 1 2 3 4 5 * Plot Median
O1 Performance considerations hinder the installation of an update. 24 27 7 9 0 0 2
O2 Downtimes caused by the update process hinder the installation of an update. 8 22 13 18 6 0 3
O4 A lack of information about the update hinder the installation of an update. 15 19 18 9 4 1 2
P1 I feel sufficiently trained as an administrator. 1 7 13 29 17 0 4
Table 3: Overview of the responses to statements regarding the frequency on a 5-point scale from “1 - Never” to “5 - Always” (*
“Not sure”) and their connection to the key observations.
ID Statement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 * Plot Median
O3 Post-installation problems in a live system are only a minor concern
because they don’t happen frequently.
8 9 8 5 12 16 9 0 5
O5 Users often install software without the knowledge of the adminis-
trator.
18 9 7 8 12 6 7 0 3
P2 Deploying security updates in a timely manner is important. 0 1 0 0 7 18 41 0 7
Table 4: Overview of the responses to statements regarding the attitude on a 7-point scale from “1 - Strongly disagree” to “7 -
Strongly agree” (* “Not sure”) and their connection to the key observations.
of formal processes). In the second phase, participants rated
1) the frequency of specific events using 5-point scales rang-
ing from “1 - Never” to “5 - Always” and 2) indicated their
agreement with different statements using 7-point scales (“1
- Strongly disagree” to “7 - Strongly agree”). The questions
were presented in random order for each participant. The
questions were chosen based on our observations and thus,
examined the impact of obstacles (e.g., “Downtimes caused
by the update process hinders the installation of an update”),
human factors (e.g., “I feel that I am sufficiently trained as
an administrator”), and information sources (e.g., selection of
sources used). The questionnaire ended with an open-ended
question about the biggest obstacles in the update process that
we coded afterwards. The new categories are marked with an
asterisk in Table 1.
To ensure the internal consistency of the collected data, we
added an attention check based on the negation of one of these
questions. Five participants, who answered both questions
with a different polarity, were excluded from the evaluation.
4.2 Recruitment and Participants
To attract professional system administrators, we decided
against using crowdsourcing platforms like Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk. Instead, we reached out to community sites like
Reddit and specialized forums. Additionally, we used Twitter
and followed a similar approach as we did in the interview
study. Posting in forums resulted in 66 answers, advertising
on Twitter resulted in 67 responses, and using personal con-
tacts in companies to spread the questionnaire contributed
eight answers.
The English survey was active for 14 days in September
2018. During this time, the questionnaire was started 141
times and completed by 72 (51.1%) participants. As reported,
five data sets were excluded from the analysis due to failed at-
tention checks, resulting in 67 valid data sets. The participants’
age ranged between 22 and 55 years. Fifty-eight of them were
male, one female, three reported “Other” and five preferred
did not specify their gender. More than 61% (41) work in
European countries. The biggest group of the participants
pool work in Germany (22), but we also received answers
from other continents, like North America(19), Australia (2)
or South America (1). Table 6 in the appendix provides an
overview of the participants’ demographics. The job-related
education of our participants can be classified as “unspecified
training,” “vendor training,” “self taught,” and “experience at
the job.” Most of the participants worked in a team (39), 16
were a team leader, and 10 worked alone. In the following,
we report on the data gathered by the questionnaire.
4.3 Results
In the following, the results of the online survey are presented
structured by the main categories presented in Table 2. The ob-
servations from the interviews suggest that company size may
have an influence on different factors. To assess this point, we
divided the data sets in two groups: 34 companies with 250
employees or fewer were tagged as small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs), and 33 companies with more than 250
employees were defined as large enterprises [11]. This was
found to be a suitable comparison because post-hoc we had
comparable group sizes. A controlled analysis of additional
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Online Publication/News
Update Management Software
Publisher Newsletter
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Other
External Services
Your Users
Main Source Additional Source
Figure 1: Distribution of information sources used by the
administrators (n=67).
factors was not feasible at this stage, and future work should
consider other aspects (e.g., experience, type of systems, and
team size). Tables 3 and 4 show the answers of the participants
to the statement they were presented.
4.3.1 Update Process and Information
U1 Figure 1 presents the sources of information administra-
tors use to learn about (new) updates. Most of the participants
reported a median of three different sources. Third-party on-
line publications are the most frequently used sources of infor-
mation. They served as a source for 54 (81%) participants, and
28 of all 67 participants (42%) even declared them the main
source of information. When focusing on the main source
of information, we found that update management tools are
essential for most administrators (46%). Fisher’s exact test
indicated no statistically significant differences between dif-
ferently sized companies (p = 0.2242). Using an optional
comment field, some administrators added other sources of
information, such as vendors, the online community (e.g.,
Twitter), work experience, and active monitoring of systems.
Due to the structure of the questionnaire, we cannot make
statements about how the participants ranked the quality of
those sources. We do not know whether they use one source
to get informed about the occurrence of an update and then
use another to capture details.
U2 To investigate the existence of formal update processes,
we asked the participants if 1) “there is a written document,”
2) “no document but an informal guideline,” or 3) “no defined
process” in their company. Twenty-eight (42%) participants
indicated the existence of formal processes, 26 (39%) ad-
ministrators had at least informal guidelines for performing
updates, and 13 (19%) participants indicated that there are
no predefined processes. A comparison of the use of for-
mal, written update processes in differently sized companies
42%
38%
45%
46%
46%
52%
50%
76%
81%
45%
36%
36%
31%
27%
20%
20%
13%
7%
12%
26%
19%
22%
27%
28%
30%
10%
12%
Risk (n=67)
Stability (n=67)
Downtime (n=67)
Introducing Errors (n=66)
Breaking Dependencies (n=66)
Priority/Time (n=66)
Lack of Information (n=65)
Performance (n=67)
Lack of Education (n=67)
100 50 0 50 100
Percentage
Response 1 2 3 4 5
Figure 2: Frequency of considerations that hinder the installa-
tion of an update. The scale ranged from “1 – Never” to “5 –
Always.” Not included are “not sure” or missing answers.
revealed a statistically significant difference between large
companies (57.6%) and smaller ones (26.5%), (p= 0.0136,
ratio= 3.769, Fisher’s exact test). This indicates that small
companies make less use of formal update processes. The
lack of such a process is not uncommon in our sample, as 10
out of 34 of the small companies did not report any kind of
defined process.
4.3.2 Update Obstacles
Figure 2 shows the share of administrators who have faced
specific obstacles during daily update routines. Quantifying
the observations, we found that general risk assessments are
known to most of the participants (94%) while deciding to
deploy specific updates. Only four (6%) participants answered
that they never considered assessing risks as an obstacle, while
63 agreed they did so at least sometimes.
O1 to O4 When asked about more specific obstacles, or
risks, stability considerations represented the biggest issues
that had been considered by 61 (91%) participants in the past.
Similarly, 59 (88%) participants considered downtime as a
specific obstacle. Lack of information (50,77%), performance
issues (43,64%) and educational aspects (39,58%) were the
least prevalent obstacles in the sample. However, even those
factors were considered by a majority of the participants.
Finally, we performed Mann-Whitney U tests to investigate
the impact of company size on the prevalence of obstacles:
We could not find statistically significant differences 9.
Fifty-five percent seemed to agree that problems after the
installation of an update are only a minor concern. However,
eight participants strongly disagreed with the statement. Five
9stability considerations: p = 0.814, downtime: p = 0.324, lack of in-
formation: p= 0.655, performance issues: p= 0.067, educational aspects:
p = 0.752, introducing errors: p = 0.611, risk considerations: p = 0.415,
breaking dependencies: p= 0.387, priority: p= 0.559
Interval
Hours to a day 11
Within a week 19
Within two weeks 8
Within one month 11
More than a month 9
No answer/no usable information (e.g., missing unit) 11
Table 5: Reported time intervals between the release of an
update and deployment on all systems.
were undecided, and 25 (37%) disagreed in some way. To
cover potential reasons for the answers, we assigned partici-
pants to two groups: those who do some kind of testing before
installing updates on the live system (n= 45,67%) and those
who do not (n= 22,33%). There was no statistically signifi-
cant difference (p= 0.2553, Mann-Whitney U test) meaning
that having a testing phase seems not to prevent all problems
after the installation. Due to the sample size, we could not
investigate if the company size is a significant factor in this
regard.
O5 Another aspect in the interview study was the user
rights. The agreement to the observation “Users often in-
stall software without the administrators’ knowledge” was
diverse. Although there was a tendency to disagree, as can
be seen by the low median (3), there were also seven strong
agreements. We found no statistical significance that would
have supported our assumption that IT companies may have
a different distribution on this than non-IT companies.
4.3.3 Human Factors
P1 Seventeen (25%) administrators reported that they al-
ways feel sufficiently trained for dealing with updates. How-
ever, 50 (74.6%) participants already faced situations for
which they did not feel sufficiently trained. An evaluation of
the impact of the administrator’s company size indicates that
administrators at large companies (Median= 4) more often
feel sufficiently trained than their colleagues at smaller com-
panies (Median= 4), Mann-Whitney U test: U = 358.0, p <
0.01, two-sided.
P2 Finally, all administrators (except one) somewhat agreed
that timely updates are important. The self-reported time span
between the release of an update and its installation can be
seen in Table 5. While some participants reported deploying
updates within a day, there were nine cases where updates
needed more than a month. Optional comments given by the
participants supported the findings that downtime, complexity,
and dependencies are common reasons for such delays.
4.3.4 (Missing) Distinction between Security- and
Feature-Updates
The interviews revealed that security- and feature-updates
are often hard to distinguish. While we did not ask for the
share of security-related patches in our interviews, the survey
participants reported that 56% (ranging from 5-100%) of the
overall updates involved security-related ones.
5 Discussion and Implications
Our work identified multidimensional problems that should
be addressed by multiple stakeholders (e.g., software vendors
or the companies themselves). In this section, we reflect on
our results, provide actionable recommendations for these
stakeholders and suggest directions for future research. We
acknowledge that many aspects reported in this paper may
seem like "common sense". With this work, we add to the
scientific evidence in this very broad area with several factors
that influence the update process and directions for further
research and discussion.
5.1 Security Implications
Our results are in line with Li et al. and show that even pro-
fessionals cannot always deploy updates in a timely fashion.
This can be a security issue since outdated systems are of-
ten vulnerable to exploits. The administrators we asked were
aware of this problem and agreed that deploying updates in
a timely manner is important. However, we found that exter-
nal factors such as compliance with company-specific rules,
inflexible processes and communication overhead (e.g., lead-
ership approval) still delay updating in practice. Future work
needs to take a more holistic view and investigate technical
and social factors in the update process. We need to under-
stand which people are involved in these processes and how
their communication can be supported. In addition, we need
to develop approaches to better communicate the urgency of
specific patches as today, the rating is often not clear [42].
5.2 Update Process
The results showed that the update processes of system ad-
ministrators are diverse and complex. Although the update
processes of administrators can be matched to the end-user
phases [62], the identified phases differ in the details. In par-
ticular, gathering information and discussing update decisions
were identified as important but time-consuming steps. As
many administrators reported they make decisions in group
meetings, we raise the question of how individual administra-
tors can be supported in their decision-making process. The
preparation process takes time and involves extensive testing.
Although the testing processes were handled differently, they
usually involved multiple iterative stages. This indicates that
administrators have to go through the whole update process
multiple times. Two findings were primarily interesting: 1)
Many companies lack formal processes, and 2) the update
process is highly complex and lacks automation. The insights
into this process provide important directions for future re-
search and immediate action items for software vendors, such
as the following:
• Formal processes seem to be more frequently used in
large companies. Whether formal processes help to re-
duce the burden of decision-making and ease the overall
process should be researched; that is, in what way they
influence the update process (e.g., can well-defined re-
sponsibilities speed up the decision and do they lead to
more and faster updates?) and where possible trade-offs
can be expected (e.g., decreased complexity versus more
time needed).
• The high number of iterative steps must be supported,
e.g., with automation approaches. Thus, it is important
to understand which phases of the process are critical
and which parts can be effectively supported by tools.
• A possible approach for improving the process could
be to connect more effectively virtual teams of admin-
istrators who share similar responsibilities and manage
similar systems. Supporting such concepts with feasible
tools can quickly lead to shared knowledge of best prac-
tices and experiences resulting in a better overview of
the effects updates have on their systems. We hypothe-
size that especially smaller companies would profit from
that.
5.3 Obstacles
The findings indicate that administrators face severe obstacles
that often hinder them from performing timely updates. In
line with Dietrich et al.’s work [12], the findings show that
the problems administrators face are diverse and intercon-
nected. Corresponding to Hrebec and Stiber’s findings [32],
individual-related factors, such as negative and positive expe-
riences with updating, as well as education, come into play.
The findings provide a baseline for future research questions
and immediate action items for software vendors, such as the
following:
• Due to the highly diverse landscape of large-scale sys-
tems, future research should further explore contextual
factors and different populations of administrators. Dif-
ferentiation of the various types of administrators could
help to better categorize participants and understand their
diverse problems and challenges. Related to this point,
the check of the external validity of the research would
benefit from better differentiation of types of adminis-
trators. However, a practicable taxonomy for this is still
missing.
• Software development should focus on reducing down-
time and providing rollback mechanisms that encourage
administrators to take the risk of potential negative ef-
fects on availability.
• Researchers and software vendors should investigate
on how to provide reliable information and accurate
documentation of the effects of an update and occurring
problems right in the moment and at the place the update
is going to be installed.
Therefore, we hypothesize that supporting administrators’ sit-
uational overview will have positive effects on timely updates.
Finally, minimizing consequences by providing reversible
updates, or just updates that have very small effects, could
furthermore help administrators to update. As an example,
dynamic software updates (DSU) [31] seems like a promising
technique to contribute to this area and could be evaluated
from this perspective.
5.4 Coping Strategies
As a consequence of facing obstacles, system administrators
have developed a diverse set of coping strategies. Although
the degree of usage varied among participants, an important
countermeasure against the growing complexity is the use of
tools that monitor update processes and support to (partly)
automate installations. Because administrators expressed the
desire for more automation, the findings emphasize the impor-
tance of the area of research that deals with the development
of such concepts [5, 26, 39, 49].
To cope with the problem of limited resources combined
with growing package sizes, the participants started to divide
update processes into multiple batches. This can have the
advantage of allowing more feedback loops and of reducing
the load on the network. However, at the same time, this
process increases the number of required iterations for single
patches. Although we argue that the footprint (e.g., resources
needed to roll out), especially of security updates, should be
minimal, this may not always be possible.
Based on the findings, we provide the following recom-
mendations to support existing coping strategies and for the
development of novel solutions:
• Hot swap functionality and small-sized patches which
enable administrators to estimate the impact of the in-
stallation on their systems, have the potential to further
ease the update processes.
• Update management tools should better support the inte-
gration of third-party software.
• Administrators’ coping strategies are still not sufficiently
understood. Thus, researchers should focus on systemat-
ically investigating different coping strategies for vari-
ous obstacles, identify desirable behavior and analyze in
which way the human aspect contributes to this.
5.5 Comparison to Results by Li et al. [41]
As mentioned in Section 2, a thematically similar publication
emerged independently while we were working on this re-
search. Li et al. published a study on system update processes
among US American system administrators, identifying an
update process that was very similar to ours [41].
The Update Process
While Li et al.’s process emerged entirely from their interview
response data, our update process was informed by theoretical
work by Vaniea et al. [62]. This could explain minor differ-
ences such as the separate testing phase we introduced to
highlight the difference to the end-user process. Despite this
difference, overall, we consider the identified processes to
be very similar. In alignment with their findings, we can con-
firm that in the information-phase, administrators use multiple
sources to derive information about updates. We didn’t find
any statistical difference in the number of sources used be-
tween administrators working in different companies (big vs
small) in our sample. Li et al. reports on the frequency of the
used sources and that three quarter of their participants used
security advisories or direct vendor notifications. In our data,
81% informed themselves using online publications and 63%
relied on publisher newsletters. We can add that despite hav-
ing multiple sources (median=3), our population uses update
management tools as their main source followed by online
resources.
Both works identified the deciding-phase. We can match
most of our identified obstacles to the reported factors of Li et
al. With a slightly different perspective, we can add an addi-
tional reported obstacle that focuses more on the administrator
executing the process than the update: missing expertise.
We can support Li et al.’s finding that testing is an im-
portant phase in the process and we encountered the same
approaches: “Staggered deployments” and “Dedicated testing
environments”. As 83 of 102 (81%) of their survey partici-
pants included some form of testing, a slightly smaller, but
still the major, part of our participants 45/67 (67%) reported
the same.
As for the remaining two phases, our works differed in
focus. While Li et al. extensively discussed the method of
deployment (automatic vs. manual) and the decision of when
to deploy in the deployment phase, our work concentrates
on the obstacles the administrators face in this phase. For
the post-installation phase, their work presents the ways in
which administrators deal with update issues, while we report
on the frequency of the occurrence of such issues (O3) in
Section 4.3.2.
Obstacles in the Update Process
Li et al. identified challenges faced by administrators within
this update process that can be categorized as: (1) obtaining
relevant information about relevant updates and deciding, (2)
preparing, testing and deploying updates in a timely fashion,
(3) recovering from update-induced errors, and (4) organiza-
tional and management influence [41]. Our identified obsta-
cles (cf. Section 3.4.2) are in line with these obstacles. Li et
al.’s work reports that identifying the relevant information in
an update can be a challenging task. We can confirm this (O4)
and show that this was mentioned by 77% of our participants.
Automation can help to deploy updates sooner and more
frequently. Li et al. have found several obstacles such as de-
pendency and compatibility considerations or host heterogene-
ity as factors that have an influence on update deployment.
In addition to those, we have found additional ones such as
missing tools or performance considerations in our data set.
Table 1 provides a summary of our findings that assigns the
problems to the phases in which they occur.
In general, while their work reveals the existence of those
problems, we can complement these problems with the fre-
quency of the problems that our survey participants stated. Li
et al. report that the recovery of updated-induced errors is a
problem that we can enrich with the fact that this seems to be
of mixed importance (O3). This could indicate that this is a
context-dependent factor, and a more detailed research must
be undertaken in this regard.
Also, Li et al.’s work reports on the existence of organiza-
tional oversight that hinders or delays updates in some cases.
We can also find this problem and show that this, among
stability and risk considerations, is of more importance than
factors such as performance considerations.
Demographics
While both Li et al.’s and our study are very similar in method-
ology, they differ in a key point: the recruited sample. Li
et al. sampled only US-based administrators, while we re-
cruited our interview-study population from Germany and
our survey participants were mostly (41 of 67) European-
based. Despite work culture in the US and Europe (e.g. in
Germany [19,30,51]) being distinctively different (stemming
from cultural differences in education, law, and professional
socialization, among others), both studies report similar find-
ings. We are thus in the fortunate situation to not only have
our methodology and findings independently validated within
a close distance in time, but also to confirm that the phenom-
ena we identified are relevant across both US and European
system administrators.
On interpreting the independently compiled findings, we
have an indication that the system administration process is
not as susceptible to cultural differences (at least in Western
societies) as other fields of work. This might be connected to
the rather globalized nature of IT infrastructure. Both partici-
pant pools used similar software, e.g., SCCM or WSUS (cf.
Section 3.4.4). It is reasonable to assume that the technical
challenges are similar. Comparing both papers, we could not
find any differences that originate in individual or organiza-
tional factors. If this can be confirmed in further studies within
different countries such as China (the largest producer of IT
hardware and systems10), Estonia (the often considered “most
advanced” country within the EU in terms of digital trans-
formation11), or Qatar (the largest economy in the Middle
East according to GDP per capita 12), this would significantly
widen the recruitment possibilities for future studies within
the field of system administration.
6 Limitations
The population we refer to as administrators is inherently
diverse in terms of responsibilities, education, and previous
experience. Depending on the size of a company, administra-
tors have different responsibilities and work either in isolation
or in larger teams. Furthermore, the security requirements de-
pend on the types of products and services a company offers.
Also, there is no unified career path for administrators, and
one must not necessarily have a degree or certificate of any
kind to become an administrator. Because of all these aspects,
the results are not generalizable and thus applicable other
populations of administrators with different demographics or
training. The participants in the online survey were mainly
from Europe and the United States. In these regions, technical
staff like administrators are predominantly male which is why
the sample was heavily biased in terms of gender. Due to our
recruitment strategy for the quantitative study, the sample po-
tentially suffered from self-selection bias, as was likely also
due to the completion rate (51.1%) of the survey. Regarding
our questionnaire, we did not ask the participants about their
current employment status. This could result in answers from
people that worked as an administrator previously and are now
in a different position. However, due to the mentioned self-
selection bias we think that the participants are still somehow
active in this area. Also, we did not collect information about
the systems and software, the administrators were in charge of.
Because of this, we cannot report possible existing differences
between, e.g., different operating systems or widespread ver-
sus niche software. The analysis is based on self-reported data,
and thus, participant reports are highly subjective. We have
no reason to believe that social desirability and recall bias
are uncommonly strong in the sample because the interviews
and related work showed that administrators tend to admit
that they do not know about everything [32]. However, this
must be taken it into account, especially when talking about
10https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%
20insights/china/china%20and%20the%20world%20inside%
20the%20dynamics%20of%20a%20changing%20relationship/
mgi-china-and-the-world-full-report-june-2019-vf.ashx
11https://www.wired.co.uk/article/estonia-e-resident,
accessed 11/21/2019.
12https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html,accessed11/
21/2019.
risk, obstacle perception, and individual perception (e.g., P1).
Finally, the qualitative interviews provided useful insights
but did not reach saturation (cf. [23]). However, the potential
lack of saturation is alleviated as the qualitative analysis was
primarily used as an exploratory first step to build hypotheses.
The answers to the free-text questions on the questionnaire
did not bring up many new topics which make us confident
that the most common real-world problems were covered.
But, although several different issues were covered, we make
no claim for completeness.
7 Ethical Considerations
Our institution located in central Europe does not have a for-
mal IRB process for this type of study but has a series of guide-
lines to follow. According to these guidelines, we limited the
collection of personal information as much as possible and
collected data separately from contact information. Further-
more, all the processes complied with the European General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). As the administration
of services in a corporate environment is a sensitive topic,
we did not collect detailed information about the companies’
infrastructures. In addition, participants were explicitly given
the chance to drop out at any time during the study. Finally,
we emphasized the option to skip questions that participants
preferred not to answer.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
This work contributes a mixed-methods study that revealed
how administrators incorporate security updates in their daily
work routines, what obstacles they experience, and what cop-
ing strategies they apply. We found that even experienced
administrators find it hard to predict the direct consequences
of applying an update and are heavily concerned about po-
tential downtimes. Another interesting observation was that
administrators often rely on information that is not provided
by the (software) vendor but by online media or by their peers,
who often face similar struggles. Among other things, the find-
ings imply that there are aspects that vendors can influence
such as, e.g., provide sufficient documentation or more gran-
ular updates, which can help to motivate administrators to
update and support them in the update process.
Based on the insights presented in this paper, we recom-
mend the following topics for future work: (1) Investigate
current established formal processes and evaluate their effec-
tiveness in supporting timely updates. (2) Create computer-
supported solutions that enable better communication be-
tween administrators and in this way, enhance the transfer of
knowledge. (3) Design and evaluate feasible tools that sup-
port situational awareness, e.g., by helping administrators to
find out about relevant updates and provide them with the
information they need.
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Appendix
A Questionnaire
Information & Consent
Hello, we’re Usable Security researchers from BLINDED
and our mission is to make your challenges with system
updates easier. As a first step, we need to understand
your experiences and struggles with software updates in a
corporate environment. We conducted interviews with seven
colleagues of you and condensed interesting themes. This
short questionnaire will take about 10 minutes to answer . We
know that your time is precious, which is why every tenth
participant gets a 3D-print of a model of her/his choice (max.
3x3x3cm and a reasonable model). If you are interested in
this form of compensation just leave us your email address in
the commentary field at the end. This email address will be
stored separately from your answers and will only be used
to communicate about your compensation. Please read all
questions and instructions carefully. All of your answers
will be checked, and your survey may be rejected in the case
of inconsistent answers. Your data will be collected and
processed in anonymized form, so that no connection to your
person can be made. You can stop participating in this study
at any time. If you have any questions please contact us via
email.
*1. I have read and understood the information provided
above and consent to take part in this study.
• I consent
• I do not consent
Demographics & General
*2. How old are you?
Text-input field
3. What ist your gender?
Text-input field
4. In what country do you work?
Text-input field
*5. For how many years have you worked as a professional
system administrator?
Text-input field
Job information
All of the questions on this page refer to a specific company.
If you currently work as an administrator, please answer these
questions about your current company. Instead, if you do
not currently work as an administrator, please answer these
questions about the last company at which you worked as an
administrator.
6. Is this company an IT company (software/hardware de-
velopment, hosting, ISP, ...)?
• Yes
• No
• Other (please specify): Text-input field
7. Which of the following statements best describes your
role in this company?
• My primary responsibility was system administration
• My primary responsibility was not system administra-
tion, but I spent at least 20% of my time on system ad-
ministration
• My primary responsibility was not system administra-
tion, but I spent between 1% and 19% of my time on
system administration
• I did not perform system administration at that company
8. In a few words, what would you consider as your main
task in the company you are working at?
Text-input field
9. What is your main task as a system administrator? If it
is the same as in the previous answer, please answer: same.
Text-input field
10. What kind of systems do you administer?
• Clients (e.g. workstations)
• Servers
• Mobile Clients (eg. tablet, smartphone)
• Other (please specify): Text-input field
* 11. How big is the company you work at as a system
administrator?
• less than 10 employees
• up to 50 employees
• up to 250 employees
• more than 250 employees
12. Do you work in a team?
• Yes, as a team leader
• Yes, as a team member
• No
• Other (please specify): Text-input field
*13. What kind of job related education did you receive?
(e.g. training, certificate, university)
Text-input field
14. Which of the following statements best describes the
security-related training you have received concerning system
administration?
• I received security-related training for system adminis-
tration at that company
• I did not receive security-related training for system ad-
ministration at that company, but I have received such
training at a previous company or school
• I have never received security-related training for system
administration
Update Process
Please be reminded that we do not collect or store identifying
information. In the following we are interested in your honest
opinion.
15. Among all software updates you install for operating
systems or any other software running on systems, approxi-
mately what percentage do you estimate are security updates?
Slider [0-100]
16. Within your job as a system administrator, how much
effort does it take you to keep the software on your systems
up-to-date?
7-point Likert scale from “1 - Nearly none” to “7 - Nearly
all my capacity”
17. What pre-deployment steps do you take before in-
stalling an update on a live system?
• We install it on a test system.
• We install it on a small number of production systems
before deploying it to all systems or to everyone.
• We install it directly on all production systems.
• Other (please specify): Text-input field
18. What is the share of security related updates in relation
to all updates (in %)?
Slider [0-100]
19. Which of the following statements best describe the
update process in the company?
• There is a written document, that formally describes the
steps in the update process.
• There is no written document but an informal guideline
that is followed in the update process.
• There is no defined update process.
20. What is the typical time-span between the release of an
update to the installation in a normal update process?
Text-input field
*21. Please indicate how often the following situations
occur:
Table of the following questions, with a 6-point Likert scale
from “1 - Never” to “5 - Always” and the option “Not sure”,
per question.
• I feel that I am not sufficiently trained as an administra-
tor.
• I think of work- related consequences when doing tasks
that have, in case of a failure, an impact on my company
(e.g. downtime of a service that everyone uses).
• I feel personally responsible for keeping the software on
my systems up-to-date.
22. Please indicate how often the following situations oc-
cur:
Table of the following questions, with a 6-point Likert scale
from “1 - Never” to “5 - Always” and the option “Not sure”,
per question.
• Stability considerations hinder the installation of an up-
date.
• Risk considerations hinder the installation of an update.
• Performance considerations hinder the installation of an
update.
• Priority/time considerations hinder the installation of an
update.
• Software updates are prevented because of other soft-
ware (e.g. dependencies).
23. Please indicate how often the following situations oc-
cur:
Table of the following questions, with a 6-point Likert scale
from “1 - Never” to “5 - Always” and the option “Not sure”,
per question.
• System stability considerations are irrelevant to the in-
stallation of an update.
• The risk of breaking dependencies hinder the installation
of an update.
• A patch that is known to introduce errors hinder the
installation of an update.
• Downtimes caused by the update process hinder the in-
stallation of an update.
• Lack of information about the changes an update intro-
duced hinder the installation of an update
• Lack of education and knowledge hinder the installation
of an update.
24. Please indicate how much you would agree/disagree
with the statements.
Table of the following questions, with a 7-point Likert scale
from “1 - Strongly disagree” to “4 - Undecided” to “7 -
Strongly agree”, per question.
• Deploying security updates in a timely manner is impor-
tant.
• Post-installation problems in a live system are only a
minor concern because they don’t happen frequently.
• Users often install software without the knowledge of
the administrator.
25. Who makes the decision whether to update or not?
• My team.
• Myself.
• My colleague(s).
• My supervisor.
• None of the above, please specify: Text-input field
26. Please indicate how often the following situations oc-
cur:
Table of the following questions, with a 6-point Likert scale
from “1 - Never” to “5 - Always” and the option “Not sure”,
per question.
• I feel sufficiently trained as an administrator.
• I can oversee the impact an update would have on our
systems.
• I can oversee the impact of a failed update on our system.
• I can oversee the security impact of updates on our sys-
tems.
Source and Tools
*27. What sources do you use to get information about current
system updates?
• Online publications/news (e.g. cnet.com, Hacker News,
heise,...)
• Update management software
• (Software) Publisher newsletters
• External services (e.g. a company that is contracted to
inform you)
• Mailing lists
• My users
• Other (please specify): Text-input field
*28. What ist your main source to get information about
current system updates?
• Online publications/news (e.g. cnet.com, Hacker News,
heise, ...)
• Update management software
• (Software) Publisher newsletters
• External services (e.g. a company that is contracted to
inform you)
• Mailing lists
• My users
• Other (please specify): Text-input field
29. Please explain your previous answer:
Text-input field
Thank you!
30. What do you think are the biggest obstacles in the update
process?
Text-input field
31. Thank you for your participation! If you have any fur-
ther comments for us: Don’t hesitate to use the textbox!
Text-input field
32 . If you are interested in the 3D model print just leave
your email in this field. We will only use this mail for the
communication and will not link it to your answers.
Text-input field
B Interview Guidelines
Questions to explore
1. What does the update process look like?
2. What obstacles are there?
3. Who is involved?
4. What is his/her personal experience and assessment?
Introduction
1. How long has he/she done the job? What is the training?
What is he/she doing on a daily basis?
2. What are the systems?
3. Does he/she work in a team?
4. What is the scope of his/her actions?
5. What tools are used?
General update process (or a specific update
story)
1. How does he/she come in contact with updates?
2. What is the time frame and the process?
3. What tools are used?
4. Who is involved?
5. Where does the information come from?
(Optional) A second story
1. How does he/she come in contact with updates?
2. What is the time frame and the process?
3. What are the tools?
4. Who is involved?
5. Where does the information come from?
End
1. Do they have a fixed update policy?
2. Are there any feelings connected to new updates or the
installation?
3. Is he/she aware of potential impacts of not installed up-
date/failures of the installation? (Are there stories?)
4. Are there wishes concerning the process/tools?
5. Questionnaire
C Demographics
Survey demographic data
n 67
Gender 1 Female
58 Male
3 Other
5 Not specified
Location 19 North America
41 Europe
7 Rest of the world
Age 22 – 55
Statistics md = 34,mn= 34.5,sd = 7.8
Experience 0.1– 30.0 years
Statistics md = 10.0,mn= 11.1,sd = 7.0
Company 34 IT-related
29 Non IT-related
4 Other
Company Size 4 ≤ 10
15 10 < x≤ 50
15 50 < x≤ 250
33 > 250
Role 50 Full-time admin
11 Not primary, but> 20% of time
6 Not primary, but < 20% of time
Administered 28 Clients
Systems 63 Servers
14 Mobile
13 Other
Table 6: Demographic data from the online survey.
Interview demographic data
Pseudonym Gender Position/Task Age Exp. (Years) Team size Supervised Machines
Markus M Administrator 25–35 6 7 300–350 clients, 150 virtual servers
Lorenz M Update management 25–35 2 n/a 5 servers
Cyril M Administrator 25–35 6 15 10,000 virtual, ca. 100 physical
Milan M Help desk 25–35 2.5 12 600 clients, number of servers
Zelko M Administrator 25–35 10 2 16 physical, 35 virtual, 80 clients
Alexander M Update management > 35 23 5 26 physical, 170 instances
Julian M Management > 35 29 20 n/a
Table 7: Interview participants.
